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A PIRATE LOOKS AT THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY: THE LEGAL STATUS OF SOMALI
PIRATES IN AN AGE OF SOVEREIGN SEAS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Michael Davey*
Mother, Mother Ocean, after all these years I've found,
My occupational hazard being my occupation's just not around.
INTRODUCTION

Captains Blackbeard and Kidd, and even Hook and Sparrow, are
the primary conception of piracy for many people.2 For these people,
"real piracy is dead and the rest is entertainment."3 But this vision of
piracy merely represents the industry during its so-called Golden
Age. 4 One need not travel to the seventeenth century or join a
Goonies5 adventure to find treasure or pirates. Pirates can be found
today in the exact same places in which they thrived three hundred
years ago: environments of lax law enforcement, advantageous geography, and sometimes even public complicity that allow them to ply
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2010; B.A., International
Political Economy, Georgetown University, 2006. I would like to thank Professors
Paolo Carozza and Mary Ellen O'Connell for their feedback and encouragement. I
would also like to thank Perry Phipps, Erin Brown, Elizabeth McCurtain, Kevin
Mahoney, Benjamin Kershaw, and Allyson Spacht for their thoughtfulness and
enthusiasm regarding this topic. Finally, all errors are my own.
1 Jimmy BUFFET, A PirateLooks at Forty, on A1A (Dunhill 1974). I would like to
apologize to Jimmy Buffet for adapting the title of his song for use in the title of this
Note.
2 See Jack A- Gor-rse-1Aux & BRIAN P. FLANAcAN, OLLY RoGER WITH AIN Uzi 143
(2000).
3 Id.
4 The Golden Age of Piracy is considered by many to be from 1692-1725. Id. at
4.
5

THE GOONIES (Amblin Entertainment 1985).
1197

1198

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 85:3

their trade out of sight and out of mind.6 Pirates have remained in
that forgotten dimension-until recently.
Somali pirates captured the world's attention on September 25,
2008, when a gang of heavily armed pirates in speedboats, referring to
themselves as the Somali Coast Guard, hijacked a Ukrainian freighter,
the Faina,carrying thirty million dollars worth of refurbished Soviet
tanks, artillery, grenade launchers and ammunition. 7 The pirates
demanded a ransom of twenty million dollars cash. 8 While this sensational story piqued the interest of many in Europe and the United
States, it also exposed seemingly uncharacteristic deferential behavior
and policy towards international outlaws. While the U.S. Navy encircled the pirates and the Russians moved in to join the engagement,
the negotiations continued.9 Certainly, concerns for the crew's safety
caution against a commando operation on a ship full of explosives,
but the galling fact is that on Somalia's Banaadir Coast this is business
as usual, and, until recently, the international community has done
little to change it.1o

The U.N. Security Council has now passed several resolutions
intended to allow foreign states to police Somali waters for pirates and
even continue their pursuit on land,"1 but the international response
has been inconsistent. The French Navy has been aggressively confronting pirates, arresting them, and sending them to Paris to face
trial.' 2 By contrast, the British Royal Navy has generally sought to
avoid confrontation with pirates due to concern over human rights
violations.1 3 With one fantastic exception, 14 the United States has also
refrained from prosecuting Somali pirates on its own soil, preferring
6 See GoTrSCHALK & FLANAGAN, supra note 2, at 10-14, 20 (discussing the environmental opportunities that led to the rise of piracy and the eventual changes in
circumstance that resulted in its demise).
7 Jeffrey Gettleman, Somalia PiratesCapture Tanks and Unwanted GlobalNotice, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2008, at Al.

8 SeeJeffrey Gettleman, Pirates Tell Their Side: They Want Only Money, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 1, 2008, at A6.
9 Gettleman, supra note 7.
10 See id.
11 See infra notes 104-05, 110-11 and accompanying text.
12 See, e.g., John S. Burnett, Op-Ed., Captain Kidd, Human-Rights Victim, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 20, 2008, at WK 12 (recounting an April 11, 2008 French commando
operation, which resulted in the capture of a gang of pirates, and its aftermath).
13 See id.
14 See Benjamin Weiser, A Young Somali in Manhattan, to Face US. Charges of Piracy,
N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 22, 2009, at Al (reporting the arraignment of a suspected Somali
pirate in the Southern District of New York).
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instead to seek arrangements for the trial of pirates in Kenya and elsewhere in the region.' 5
This somewhat reluctant response from the international community is in large part the result of states proceeding cautiously in
nebulous legal waters.16 The effectiveness of Security Council resolutions has been limited because they leave unresolved the ultimate
issue of a pirate's legal status.17 Piracy-the world's oldest crime
against the law of nations-does not have an easily applied and universally accepted definition.' 8 First, it is not clear what a pirate-as
opposed to a sea-robber, mutineer, or terrorist-is. Second, it is hotly
contested whether piracy creates international jurisdiction, or
whether areas of international jurisdiction (the high seas) create the
only opportunity for legally cognizable piracy. Third, further ambiguity surrounds the question of whether a pirate has a nationality or
human rights. Resolution of the Somali pirates' legal status will provide solid legal footing that will enable the international community
to pursue the pirates forcefully.
This Note attempts to define the legal status of Somali pirates.
Part I examines the history of piracy and its past legal treatment in
order to determine the customary international law of piracy as it
existed prior to the twentieth century. Part II examines modern
piracy generally, and then more specifically in the context of Somalia,
with the purpose of establishing whether the Somali mariner-militants
are in fact pirates. Part III surveys the twentieth century legal agreements on the use of force, the law of the sea, and human rights, in
15 See Jeffrey Gettleman, Rounding up Suspects, the West Turns to Kenya as Piracy
Criminal Court, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 24, 2009, at A8.
16 See Burnett, supranote 12 (explaining that the British Royal Navy's reluctance
to detain pirates may be due to the fact that captured pirates may be granted asylum
because of the gruesome nature the punishments they faced under Islamic Law in
their country of origin); Eugene Kontorovich, InternationalLegal Responses to Piracy off
the Coast of Somalia, ASIL INSIGHTS, Feb. 6, 2009, http://www.asil.org/insights090206.
cfm; see also Mark Landler, PalauAgrees to Take ChineseDetainees, Helping Obama's Guantdnamo Plan, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2009, at A6 (describing the difficulties of finding a
safe relocation state, outside of the United States, for seventeen ethnic Uighurs from
Western China).
17 See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
18 See Martin Murphy, Piracy and UNCLOS: Does International Law Help Regional
States Combat Piracy?, in VIOLENCE AT SEA 155, 159-73 (Peter Lehr ed., 2007) (detailing the limitations of the piracy provisions of the U.N. Convention of the Law of the
Sea, due to the difficulty of establishing a universal definition of piracy); cf Michael
Bahar, Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and Strategic Theory for Naval AntiPiracy Operations,40 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 17 (2007) (observing that "there may be
at least six different meanings of 'piracy' circulating among various domestic and
international laws").
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order to determine the extent to which the customary international
law of piracy may have been codified, supplemented, or overridden.
Finally, Part IV analyzes the implications of the newly established
Somali pirates' legal status, with particular focus on who may-and
who ought to-assert jurisdiction over the Somali pirates, and what
can-and what ought to-be done with the Somali pirates upon their
arrest.
I.

A

BRIEF HISTORY OF PIRACY

Records of anti-piracy laws date back to the ancient Athenians,19
but the Roman Republic made the first lasting impression on piratical
jurisprudence. 20 Cicero famously declared pirates to be hostis humani
generi, meaning "enemy of all mankind." 2 1 In so declaring, Cicero and
the Romans introduced the element of universal jurisdiction into the
law of piracy.22
There are two interpretations of Cicero's universal jurisdiction
over pirates. Some scholars have argued that even at this early stage
of the law of nations, the principle of universal jurisdiction over
pirates was inherently limited by the extent of municipal jurisdiction. 23 In other words, an individual who committed piratical acts was
not considered a pirate while within any nation's municipal jurisdiction, and therefore was not susceptible to prosecution by any nation
except the one within whose territorial waters he was.2 4 An alternative
interpretation is that the principle of universal jurisdiction was a legal
compromise between effective enforcement of the law against pirates
and the sovereign rights of nations over their territorial waters.25 The
compromise of universal jurisdiction, therefore, was to permit
encroachments by foreign nations in the territorial waters of any
nation for the purpose of hunting down pirates and protecting commerce among nations. 26 The determination as to which interpretation of this crucial tenant of the law against piracy. has become
customary international law-if either interpretation has become so
19 See GoTrscHALI. & FLANAGAN, supra note 2, at 1.
20 See Douglas R. Burgess, Jr., Hostis Humani Generi: Piracy, Terrorism and a New
International Law, 13 U. MIAMI INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 293, 301 (2006).
21 Id.
22 See id. at 302.
23 See id.
24 See id.
25 See Murphy, supra note 18, at 161.
26 See id.
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developed-requires further inquiry into the evolution of piracy and
universal jurisdiction as developed in the common law.2 7
Throughout the history of Western Civilization, pirates, despite
bearing the label of enemies of all mankind, have not been consistently treated as criminals. 28 Often, warring, or merely rival, European
nations supplemented their navies with pirates. 29 As one scholar
noted, "Queen Elizabeth viewed pirates as an essential adjunct to the
Royal Navy." 30 Pirates were used to diminish the accrual of wealth by
foreign powers while maintaining an official peace among nations.3 1
Alternatively, pirate attacks could serve as a desired provocation to
lure an enemy into a war it was not prepared to wage.3 2 Of further
advantage was the broad base of sailors experienced in maritime combat that pirates provided.3 3 The problem, however, for countries that
used pirates as weapons against each other was that the pirates could
not be relied upon to forego their piratical activity upon request of
government or even by mandate of law. 34 The pirates' rejection of law
and the exercise of their will against the interests of society firmly
placed them in the class unto themselves that Cicero had long ago
identified.
Pirates considered themselves to be legally separate from any
nation or rule of law.3 5 Blackstone assessed the pirate's unique legal
status as one characterized by perpetual war with society: a pirate
"[h]as renounced all the benefits of society and . .. by declaring war
against all mankind, all mankind must declare war against him: so that
every community hath a right, by the rule of self-defence, to inflict
that punishment upon him . . . ."3 6 True to the conception of pirates
as separate legal entities, pirate ships operated under their own laws27 Pirates are not a phenomenon of Western civilization; rather, they are common to all maritime civilizations. See GorrSCHAIK & FLANAGAN, supra note 2, at 63.
The rise of the law of nations, however, does appear to be rooted in Western civilization. Therefore, at the risk of an ethnocentric analysis of piracy, the inquiry into
piracy and its evolution in the law will focus predominately on piracy as it occurred
and was treated in the West for the purpose of gaining a better understanding of
customary international law.
28 See Burgess, supra note 20, at 298.
29 See id.
30 Id. at 302.
31 See id. at 302-03.
32 See id.
33 See id.
34 See id. at 303-06 (describing the reasons for turning pirate, which were wholly
divorced from defending the Crown).
35 See id. at 306.
36 4 WILLAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *71.
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known as "pirate articles"-that were "often as specific and meticulous
as acts of Parliament."37 Thus, in the law of nations there were three
legal categories in the eighteenth century: states, civilians, and
pirates. 8
Pirates, once considered assets to states, became liabilities at the
close of the seventeenth century. As the states' interest in peace grew
in order to support flourishing maritime commerce, pirates became a
universal problem and thus lived up to their ancient title as the enemies of all mankind. In 1856, the European nations signed the Declaration of Paris,3 9 which abolished state-sponsored piracy and sounded
the death knell for piracy in the West as Western imperial powers
cooperated to eradicate the mutual threat to their continued
prosperity. 4 0
Universal jurisdiction has been a long-standing practical solution
to the common problem of piracy throughout the history of Western
civilization. 4 1 In a time when the political force of the world was
amassed in only a few empires with a common heritage and a common interest in distant commerce, universal jurisdiction over pirates
was a logical response. 42 As more nations set to sea, the interest in
peaceful maritime commerce correspondingly grew, but the practice
of international anti-piracy enforcement and the application of universal jurisdiction changed. 4 3
A rift developed between universal jurisdiction over piracy in theory and in practice as emerging maritime powers enacted domestic
legislation to enforce international norms against piracy and as the
scourge of piracy diminished. 44 Thus, pirates in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries were increasingly "hunted down by their own
countrymen."45 This evolving practice carried with it two implications
contrary to the theoretical tenets of universal jurisdiction. First, routine domestic enforcement potentially implied exclusive domestic
37
38
39

Burgess, supra note 20, at 305.
See id. at 299.
Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, rprintedin THE LAWS OF
ARMED CONFLICT 787 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiff Toman eds., 1988).
40 See Bahar, supra note 18, at 12-13; see also PHILIP GOSSE, THE HISTORY OF PIRACY
297-98 (1932)

(discussing the decline of Western piracy in the late nineteenth

century).
41 See Murphy, supra note 18, at 161.
42 See id.
43 See id.
44 See id.
45 Id.
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jurisdiction over pirates in a state's territorial waters. 46 The competence of emerging powers to police their own coastal waters and the
interests in reserving the economic exploitation of coastal waters to
nationals created both an incentive and a justification for excluding
foreign military powers from a state's territorial waters. As the threat
of large-scale piracy diminished at the turn of the twentieth century,
the need for foreign powers to contest exclusive domestic jurisdiction
diminished correspondingly and removed a strong justification for the
maintenance of truly universal jurisdiction over pirates in the face of
the increasing demands for exclusivity of territorial waters. Second,
domestic enforcement over pirates that typically operated close to
home allowed for a retained association by pirates to their country of
origin. 47 Thus, pirates, as conceived of by those who were enforcing
domestic laws against them, had not removed themselves from society
or declared war against mankind, but rather were domestic criminals.
This brief historical survey, and particularly the late-arriving emergence of greater domestic enforcement against piracy, tends to show
that universal jurisdiction over pirates was a compromise among
nations to sacrifice exclusivity of municipal maritime jurisdiction in
order to gain safer, more dependable, and more lucrative maritime
commerce. Thus, according to customary international law-at least
as it was at the turn of the twentieth century-piracy was not limited
to geographic zones of predetermined universal jurisdiction, but
rather universal jurisdiction over pirates extended to anywhere a
pirate could be found.4 8
Four other observations regarding customary international law
may be made from a historical analysis of piracy. First, piracy is an
occupational crime. While an act of piracy is certainly a prerequisite
to becoming a pirate, it is the status of being a pirate-being an
enemy of mankind-that is the crime.49 Second, activities that constitute "acts of piracy" are not specifically delineated by international
law, but rather are subject to specifications set forth by municipal governments.5 0 As a result, acts of piracy have been construed in a variety
of ways, including constructions so narrow as to only encompass "sea

46 See id. ("In fact . . . this universal jurisdiction existed more in theory than reality."); see also GorrscHALK & FLANAGAN, supra note 2, at 32 (describing the illegality of
foreign state enforcement actions in another state's territorial waters).
47 See Murphy, supra note 18, at 161.
48 See Burgess, supra note 20, at 314.
49 See id.
50 See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 158-60 (1820).
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robbery,"5 ' and constructions so broad as to include any business-dealings with those engaged in sea robbery.5 2 Thus, depending on municipal legislation, a pirate may exist on land without ever having set to
sea. Customary international law has the capacity to define piracy so
broadly as to include any acts that further the pirate industry, but still
retains tremendous flexibility by allowing for municipal specification
of acts constituting piracy.
Third, a pirate remains a pirate whether he is financed, condoned, or supported by a recognized state or not. A state that aids
and abets a private enterprise-or even a quasi-legitimate political
organization-in order to violate the territorial integrity of another
state53 does not legitimize actions taken by the enterprise or organization. Rather, that state is itself in violation of international law.54 Historically, pirates have demonstrated that they have an agenda
independent of states, even where they operate for the benefit of a
given state, and thus they maintain a separate legal status that remains
unchanged and unqualified by state sponsorship.
Fourth, a pirate's legal separation from states necessarily implies
that he is devoid of citizenship.5 5 Today this implication has substantial relevance, but in historical practice a determination of citizenship
was rendered moot by universal jurisdiction and capital punishment.5 6
Historical practice does, however, offer three exceptions in which
pirates maintained their citizenship. First, pirates in league with a
state were not considered pirates by that state because they never severed the connection between themselves and their political community.5 7 Second, a state could pardon pirates, and those pardoned
51 Burgess, supra note 20, at 310-11 (discussing English Justice Sir Charles
Hedges's definition of piracy). The International Maritime Board more precisely
defines piracy as "an act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in furtherance of that act." PETER CHALK, THE MARITIME DIMENSION OF
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 3 (2008).
52 See Burgess, supra note 20, at 312 (discussing Britain's Piracy Act of 1721).
53 "[A] ship on the high seas is . . . placed in the same position as [the] national
territory .. . of the State under whose flag the vessel sails . . . ." In re S.S. Lotus (Fr. v.
Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 25 (Sept. 7).
54 See Military & Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 118-19
(June 27).
55 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *71; Burgess, supra note 20, at 306-07.
56 See A Collection of Piracy Laws of Various Countries,26 AM. J. INT'L L. 887, 895-96
(Supp. 1932) (observing that death was the punishment for piracy in the United
States until 1897, and in Great Britain until 1832).
57 See GorrsCHALK & FLANAGAN, supra note 2, at 19. The tale of Captain Kidd
actually shows the limits of this exception. See id. at 15-17.
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would themselves peaceably reenter society.5 8 Third, a state could
determine that an individual who sailed and plundered with pirates
was not actually a pirate at all, but had been impressed into service as
a member of the crew. 59 Thus, while a pirate is theoretically stateless,
states did permit those pirates against whom they declined to enforce
piracy laws to be a part of their political community, which indicates
that pirates cannot completely forsake their citizenship. The crime of
piracy is fundamentally a renunciation of society, but after society has
undertaken some sort of legal proceedings regarding the individual's
piratical acts, that individual may reenter society. In sum, even
pirates-the enemies of all mankind-hold a residual citizenship in
their country of origin.
The customary international law of piracy that developed over
the two thousand year period ending at the turn of the twentieth century is due respectful consideration. This law was born of the common experience of many and various nations and empires, enduring
across time despite significant technological change. Throughout
diverse periods of human history, in which the world was intimately
familiar with the scourge of piracy, this functional customary law to
combat piracy was known and employed with legitimacy and some success. Piracy may not have been a serious twentieth century problem,
but it is becoming a rather serious twenty-first century problem.6 0 In
addressing this recurring problem, we would be remiss to cast aside
the ample accumulation of knowledge and law from piracy's past.
II.

MODERN PIRACV

A.

In General

Today, piracy is on the rise. The annual average number of
reported actual or attempted pirate attacks around the world for the
period from 2000 to the end of 2006 amounts to almost one attack
each day, and represents a sixty-eight percent increase from the
annual average from 1994 to 1999.61 Moreover, many more pirate
attacks occur than are reported-perhaps twice as many.6 2 Of equally
great concern is the more advanced weaponry of which the pirates are
availing themselves. Noel Choong, director of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) office in Kuala Lumpur observed, "'Five to six
58
59
60
61
62

See id. at 19-20.
See id.
CHALK, supra note 51, at 6-13 (discussing the recent emergence of piracy).
See id. at 6.
See id. at 7.
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years ago, when pirates attacked, they used machetes, knives, and pistols. Today, they come equipped with AK-47s, M-16s, rifle grenades,
and RPGs.'" 63 Piracy's ascendance creates a number of dangers that
could cause catastrophic damage.
The costs of piracy are felt most acutely by the crew of seized
ships. Although few crew members are ever killed by pirates, hundreds of crew members are held hostage each year. 6 4 In economic
terms, the plague of piracy is manifest in increased insurance premiums, increased avoidance of pirate-infested waters, and correspondingly decreased trade and use of ports in countries whose coasts have
high concentrations of pirates.6 5 The IMB estimates that piracy may
cost the shipping industry up to sixteen billion dollars annually. 66
Furthermore, the potential for a large scale economic disaster resulting from collisions of hijacked vessels in heavily trafficked shipping
lanes remains ever present. Such a collision could close down an
entire channel and port operations for months, and subsequent pollution of the water could also destroy marine life and fertile coastal lowlands, not only crippling any industries dependent on navigating and
harvesting the affected areas, but potentially threatening the sources
of food on which the inhabitants of the region are dependent.67 Politically, piracy can breed corruption among public officials that may
weaken a government's claim to legitimacy or hinder a government's
attempt to gain control of its territory.6 8
Modern piracy is a truly global problem. While there is an inclination among residents of advanced industrialized nations to dismiss
piracy as a problem reserved for the third world, pirate attacks do
occur in Europe and North America.69 Furthermore, North American and European interests are still threatened, even when pirate
63 Id. at 14 (quoting Choong).
64 See Piracy Doubles in First Six Months of 2009, ICC COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVS., July
15, 2009, http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id=
362:piracy-doubles-in-first-six-months-of-2009&catid=60:news&Itemid=51
(reporting
561 crew members taken hostage in the second quarter of 2009); Int'l Maritime Org.,
Piracy in Waters off the Coast of Somalia, http://www.imo.org/home.asp?topic
id=1178 (last visited Nov. 23, 2009) (reporting over 600 sailors were held hostage by
Somali pirates in 2008).
65 See CHALK, supra note 51, at 15-16.
66 Id. at 16.
67 See id. at 17; GorrsCHALK & FLANAGAN, supra note 2, at 114.
68 See Peter Lehr & Hendrick Lehmann, Somalia-Pirates'New Paradise, in VioLENCE AT SEA, supra note 18, at 1, 14-15.
69 See id. at 44-55; see also Michael Schwirtz, Russia Says Ship's Hijackers Were Taken
Without a Shot, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 19, 2009, at A4 (describing the capture and liberation
of a Russian cargo ship taken in the Baltic Sea).
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attacks occur in distant regions, by virtue of European and North
American nations' extensive involvement in maritime commerce.7 0 In
fact, the vast majority of pirate attacks do occur in distant regions,
particularly off the coasts of Africa and Southeast Asia.71 In these
locations, pirates take advantage of zones of high congestion, an
inability of certain states to police their waters, and a proliferation of
small arms. 72 The attention and vigilance of the entire global community will be required to combat these circumstances that enable piracy
to threaten the global community. Modem piracy has presented itself
as a real threat to humanity, and it merits a legal response in kind.
B. Piracy in Somalia
Piracy off the Somali coast only contributes approximately eight
percent of the world's reported pirate activity,7 3 yet the waters off
Somalia have been declared the most dangerous in the entire Indian
Ocean by the IMB. 74 Somali pirates are known for indiscriminately
attacking vessels ranging in size from small fishing trawlers to massive
oil tankers.7 5 Both the IMB and the U.S. Department of State have
advised international shippers and others to avoid the Port of Mogadishu and stay at least two hundred miles off the Somali coast.7 6 In fact,
the region has become so notoriously dangerous that the United
Kingdom's National Union of Marine, Aviation and Shipping Transport (NUMAST) wants the coastal waters to be declared a war zone.7 7
The Somali pirates, for all their ferocity, have rather humble ori78
gins. Modern Somali piracy was born of poor coastal fishermen.
After the collapse of the Somali government in 1991, and the subsequent collapse of the Somali Navy, the fisheries off the Somali coast
could no longer be protected from foreign exploitation.7 9 The poor
70

See CHALK, supra note 51, at 36.

71

See id. at 10 fig.2.2.

72 See id. at 10-14.
73 See id. at 10 fig.2.2. Four percent of the world's reported pirate activity is
directly attributable to Somalia, whereas another four percent occurs in the Gulf of
Aden and the Red Sea. Id. Piracy in the Gulf of Aden is fairly attributable to Somali
pirates because the Gulf is on Somalia's north shore, parts of which are notorious
pirate havens. SeeJeffrey Gettleman, Somalia's PiratesFlourish in a Lawless Nation, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 31, 2008, at Al.

74
75

Lehr & Lehmann, supra note 68, at 6.
See id. at 14; Associated Press, Pirates Hijack Philippine Chemical Tanker Off
Somalia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2008, at A14.
76 Lehr & Lehmann, supra note 68, at 6.
77 See id.
78 See id. at 13-14.
79 See id. at 11-14 (analyzing the factors that gave rise to Somali piracy).
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Somali fishermen along the coast suffered as foreign trawlers
encroached further and further into Somalia's exclusive economic
zone, using internationally banned fishing equipment that transformed their rich maritime environment into a wasteland.s0 The
Somali fishing vessels also suffered violence at the hands of foreign
fishing vessels that destroyed Somali fishing equipment and even
rammed smaller Somali fishing vessels.8 1 As their country fell to
pieces, the Somali fishermen had only themselves to look to for protection. They armed themselves and confronted foreign vessels
demanding "taxes."8 2 As Somali diplomat Mohamed Osman Aden
observed, "'From there, they got greedy .... They start[ed] attacking
everyone.'" 8 3
Today, Somali piracy is predominantly a ransom-driven business,8 4 though evidence of their evolution from fishermen engaging
in self-defense is still apparent. For example, in holding forty-eight
crew members of Taiwanese trawlers hostage in August 2005, the
pirates referred to themselves as the "Somali Volunteer National Coast
Guard" and referred to the ransom of $5000 per head as a fine for the
criminal act of illegal fishing.8 5 More recently, the spokesman for the
pirate crew that seized the Faina told the Western media that they
"'don't consider [themselves] sea bandits.'" 8 6 Instead, he asked that
the pirates be thought of as a coast guard that patrols the waters to
stop illegal fishing and dumping.8 7 The spokesman went further to
proclaim that the pirates had no intention of killing the crew, or offloading the cargo of tanks and grenade launchers, nor had the pirates
any idea that such cargo was onboard when they decided to seize the
ship.88 As their spokesman stated so simply, "' [The pirates] just want
the money."' 8 9 Regardless of the Somali mariners' initial motivation
for attacking foreign ships, it is clear that they now operate for personal enrichment as opposed to self-defense or civic duty. Today, the
individuals seizing ships off Somalia are no longer fishermen, nor are
they members of a coast guard. Rather, they are highly organized
pirates engaged in a violent quest for treasure.
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

See id. at 13.
See id.
Gettleman, supra note 8.
Id. (quoting Mohamed Osman Aden).
See, e.g., id.
Lehr & Lehmann, supra note 68, at 14.
Gettleman, supra note 8 (quoting Sugule Ali).
Id.
Id.
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All piracy requires an enabling environment, and in Somalia "the
enabling environment is formed by the failed state itself."9 0 As one
reporter observed, "What is happening off Somalia's shores is basically
an extension of the corrupt, violent free-for-all that has raged on land
... since the central government imploded in 1991."91 Due to the
government's inability to regulate its seas, pirates were able to take
hold. Now, the thriving pirate industry92-one of the few successful
industries in Somalia-has created entrenched interest groups.9 3
Many corrupt government officials, warring and rival clans, and even
small coastal fishing communities have strong interests in the continued success of the Somali pirates.9 4 Under such conditions, the
growth of the pirate industry is easy to explain: "'All you need is three
guys and a little boat, and the next day you're millionaires.'" 9 5 But the
prosperity of a few has come at the expense of many. In addition to
the danger and expense to international shipping interests, the prevalence of piracy has severely harmed legitimate port and fishing activities, as well as trade, in an economy that cannot afford obstacles to its
development.9 6 In discouraging legitimate economic activity, pirates
have also deprived the government of taxes.9 7 Worse still, piracy has
hampered United Nations' relief efforts for the starving inland Somali
population." Pirates are contributing to the lack of economic devel90 Lehr & Lehmann, supra note 68, at 11.
91 Gettleman, supra note 73.
92 Presently, the Somali pirate industry employs over 1000 gunmen who collected
approximately $120 million in 2008 alone. See Mary Kimani, Tackling Piracy offAfrican
Shores, AFR. RENEWAL, Jan. 2009, at 3; Andrew Cawthorne, Somali Pirates Seize Dutch
Boat, Chase U.S. Ship, REUTERS, May 7, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL755771. The marked growth in attacks is manifest in the increased number of pirate attacks. See, e.g., Mark McDonald, ForSomali Pirates,2009 Is a Record Year,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2009, at A9 (reporting that Somali pirates registered a two hundred percent increase in attacks from 2007 to 2008, and set a record for highest
annual number of pirate attacks in 2009).
93 See Gettleman, supra note 73.
94 See id. (describing the "not-so-underground" pirate industry in Boosaaso,
Somalia, where "[e]very time a seized ship tosses its anchor, it means a pirate shopping spree"); see also Lehr & Lehman, supra note 68, at 12-13, 17 (stating that coastal
communities "actively turn[ ] a blind eye" to piracy).
95 Gettleman, supra note 73 (quoting Abdullahi Omar Qawden, a former captain
of the defunct Somali Navy).
96 See id.
97 See id.
98 See id.; see also Lehr & Lehman, supranote 68, at 2-3 (recounting the hijacking
of the MV Semlow and the MV Miltzow in 2005, which were chartered by the U.N.
World Food Program to deliver 850 tons of food aid to Somali victims of the Boxing
Day tsunami of December 2004).
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opment and attainment of political stability in Somalia. Thus, the
prevalence of piracy itself has created further incentive to engage in
piracy while simultaneously limiting the Somali government's capacity
to enforce anti-piracy laws.
In order to successfully combat the Somali pirates, international
assistance is required. The former Prime Minister of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Ali Mohamed Gedi,9 9 had
appealed to neighboring countries to send naval assistance to enforce
some sort of law in Somali waters.1 00 Unfortunately, Somalia's neighbors are not in a position to assist in anti-piracy efforts. The current
Somali government's chief ally in the region, Ethiopia, is a landlocked
country, and withdrew even from its land engagement in Somali territory in response to widespread Somali resentment.10 1 Somalia's other
regional neighbors such as Eritrea, Yemen, and Kenya, while perhaps
having an incentive to provide a modicum of order off the Somali
coast, have only a limited naval capacity that leaves them barely able to
patrol their own exclusive economic zones, let alone combat the hundreds of heavily armed and coordinated pirates operating in Somali
waters.102
Lacking national and regional enforcement capability, Western
navies are absolutely necessary to quell the rise of piracy in Somalia.
NATO initiated a mission in the region known as Operation Allied
Provider that actively engaged in anti-piracy operations.10 3 The mission was undertaken pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolutions
1816104 and 1838,105 which authorize any foreign navy to enter Somali
territorial waters and use all necessary force to combat piracy that
99 Gedi resigned from the post of prime minister on October 29, 2007 after a
falling out with then President Yusuf. SeeJeffrey Gettleman, Somalia Premier Quits as
Colleagues Cheer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2007, at A8. President Yusuf resigned as well on
December 29, 2008, after international pressure to step down. Jeffrey Gettleman,
Islamist Militants in Somalia Begin to Fight One Another, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2008 at A6
[hereinafter Gettleman, Islamist Militants]. President Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed is
now in control of the TFG. SeeJeffrey Gettleman, In Long-Riven Somalia, a Leader Is
Raising Hopes for Stability, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2009, at Al.
100 See Lehr & Lehmann, supra note 68, at 6.
101 See Mohammed Ibrahim &Jeffrey Gettleman, Suicide Bombers Hit Pockets of Calm
in North Somalia, Killing at Least 21, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 30, 2008, at Al7.
102 See Lehr & Lehmann, supra note 68, at 18.
103 Associated Press, NATO Fleet Sails Toward Somalia to Guard Against Piracy, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 23, 2008, at A12; see N. Ad. Treaty Org., Counter-Piracy Operations, http:/
/www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48815.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2009) [hereinafter NATO, Counter-Piracy].
104 S.C. Res. 1816, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008).
105 S.C. Res. 1838, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008).
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would be consistent with the treatment of piracy by international law
if it were to take place on the high seas.1 06 Operation Allied Provider
included among its functions the escort of vessels chartered by the
U.N. World Food Program, as well as the patrol of shipping lanes off
the coast of Somalia. 0 7 In December 2008, the European Union
(EU) took over this mission under the name Operation Atalanta.1 0
States that are not members of NATO or the EU have also sent navies
to engage pirates in the region pursuant to the Security Council Resolutions, including India, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and China. 09
With new international support pouring in from a wide range of faraway countries, anti-piracy efforts have recently picked up
momentum.
The most significant development, however, has been U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1851,110 which authorizes any and all
countries combating piracy off the Somali coast to engage pirates on
land or sea provided that there is advance consent by the TFG.'"
Consent from the TFG will not be difficult to obtain considering that
the extent of the government's direct control of Somali territory is a
tenuous hold over a mere few city blocks inside Mogadishu. 112 The
beleaguered TFG is desperate for any international assistance, and is
no doubt hopeful that international anti-piracy efforts on land may be
translated to support for the TFG itself in its efforts to establish dominance over rival Somali factions." 3 However, Resolution 1851 does
not appear to be an indirect method of engaging Islamic insurgents;
instead Resolution 1851 is a recognition of the magnitude of the problem of Somali piracy and an attempt to bring international pressure to
bear on all groups in Somalia that engage in the entire pirate
industry.114

The U.N. Security Council Resolutions (collectively, the Resolutions) have been successful in identifying the scope of Somali piracy
106 See S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 104, 7; S.C. Res. 1838, supra note 105, 1 2.
107 NATO, Counter-Piracy, supra note 103.
108 See NATO Hands Over Counter-PiracyOperation to EU, N. ATL. TREATY ORG., Dec.
15, 2008, http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/12-december/el215a.html.
109 See Jeffrey Gettleman, Pirates in Skiffs Still Outmaneuvering Warships off Somalia,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2008, at A6; Mark McDonald, China Seems Prepared to join
Antipirate Patrols, in Rare Move Beyond the Pacific, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008, at A6.
110 S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008).
111 See id. 1 6. This authorization, which was set to expire in December 2009, was
renewed for another twelve month period in November 2009 by U.N. Security Resolution 1897. S.C. Res. 1897, 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1897 (Nov. 30, 2009).
112 See Gettleman, Islamist Militants, supra note 99.
113 See Lehr & Lehmann, supra note 68, at 19.
114 See S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 110.
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and encouraging a coordinated international response, but their overall effectiveness has been limited by their failure to apply the customary international law of piracy.11 5 As a result, confusion still exists
among Western navies over the international law of piracy and the
permissible extent of the use of force. On a number of occasions, the
Danish Navy has released suspected pirates captured off the Somali
coast onto the beach after concluding that the Danish government
did not have jurisdiction over the pirates.' 1 6 The Italian Navy also
seems reluctant to arrest pirates, preferring to limit itself to warding
off pirate attacks rather than dealing with the potential legal quagmire that might follow an assertion of jurisdiction.1 17 This avoidance
of legal proceedings against pirates has proven instructive for the
pirates in international law. One pirate, Jama Ali, claims that the
pirates "'know international law,"' which is to say that the pirates are
not concerned about the possibility of arrest by foreign navies because
they believe that they will be promptly released on a Somali beach
upon capture.' 1 8 Perhaps then, the one-time lethal American
response to an American citizen being held hostage took the Somali
pirates by surprise, but it appears to have done little to systematically
discourage pirates from continuing their attacks, even against American-flagged ships.1 1 9 Indeed, despite the international response fostered by the Resolutions, the Somali pirates attacked and hijacked a
record number of ships in 2009.120 While the Resolutions have been
helpful in combating piracy in some respects, they have not provided
adequate legal guideposts to foreign navies. The Resolutions presume
to authorize an enormous exception in the case of Somalia to customary international law, rather than blessing the anti-piracy activities that
the U.N. is encouraging as customary international law, with the result
that some foreign navies are reluctant to engage in activities that constitute the exception to the rule.
The Security Council's authorization of universal jurisdiction
over Somali pirates has introduced three highly relevant and explicit
assumptions that reflect a major change in the conception of international piracy law over the last hundred years. First, the Resolutions
115 See id. [ 10. U.N. Security Resolution 1851 expressly disavows any contribution
to customary international law. Id.
116 See Gettleman, supra note 109; see also Gettleman, supra note 73 (recounting

the Dutch Navy's September 2008 arrest and subsequent release of ten men found on
a boat in possession of a long ladder and rocket-propelled grenades).
117 See Gettleman, supra note 109.
118 Id. (quoting Jama Ali).
119 See Commercial Crime Servs., supra note 64.
120 McDonald, supra note 92.
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treat the enforcement jurisdiction exercised by foreign navies over
pirates in Somali territorial seas as an exception to international customary law, rather than the status quo. 121 The Security Council justifies this exception on the basis of the express plea for help from the
internationally recognized-although internally inept-Somali government. 122 Presumably, the Security Council believes that without
the Somali Republic's permanent representative to the United
Nations's request for international assistance it would be violating
international law to exercise jurisdiction over pirates in Somali lands
or waters. Second, the Resolutions stress the need for adherence to
international human rights law in conducting anti-piracy patrols.' 2 3
Third, the Resolutions acknowledge the existence of the nationality of
pirates, and even encourage the national governments from which the
pirates originate to exercise jurisdiction over them-although not
exclusively.124 The Resolutions thus represent a departure from the
customary law of piracy-at least as it existed prior to the twentieth
century. In order to gain a better idea of the context in which the
Resolutions were made and insight into the legitimacy of their departure from the ancient law of piracy, an examination of the transformation of international law governing the use of force, piracy and the
seas during the twentieth century is essential.
III.

TRANSFORMATION OF THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE FOR THE CRIME
OF PIRACY

A.

The Reach of UniversalJurisdiction in an Era of IncreasingState
Sovereignty over the Seas

The customary international law of piracy that developed prior to
the twentieth century was well suited to combat piracy. Legally
unqualified universal judicial and enforcement jurisdiction over
pirates justified on the basis of the noncitizenship of pirates was a
highly effective legal tool that prevented pirates from seeking refuge
by traveling into nearby foreign jurisdictions unwilling or unable to
121

122
123
124
coastal
armed
law ...

See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 110, 1 10.
See S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 104, 1 9.
See id. 1 11.
See id. The Resolution "[c] alls upon all States, and in particular flag, port and
States, States of the nationality of victims and perpetrators or [sic] piracy and
robbery, and other States with relevant jurisdiction under international
." Id.
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exercise their own anti-piracy measures. 25 However, at the time the
law of the sea underwent a process of codification,12 6 piracy was
becoming less of a concern for nations worldwide. The lull in pirate
activity diminished the priority given to the customary law of piracy as
the law of the sea was codified.
In 1932, the Harvard Group-a group of jurists assembled by
Harvard Law School and tasked by a League of Nations committee at
loggerheads to determine the significance of piracy in the law of
nations127-observed the confusion in customary international law
resulting from the change in circumstances quite clearly:
The reason for the startling lack of international case authority and
modern state practice is apparent, as soon as one remembers that
large scale piracy disappeared long ago and that piracy of any sort
on or over the high sea[s] is sporadic except in limited areas bordered by states without the naval forces to combat it. Piracy lost its
great importance in the law of nations before the modern principles of finely discriminated state jurisdictions . . . became thoroughly established.

. .

. Formerly naval powers fought pirates with

little regard for the sort of problems that would trouble our modern
world of intense commerce and strongly asserted national claims of
numerous states .... 128
Further compounding the minimization of piracy law, as also noted by
the Harvard Group, was a movement to claim larger territorial seas.
Customary law initially provided for territoriality over only those
waters that could be enclosed and occupied, and thus a state's territorial claims were limited to internal waterways and ports.' 2 9 Gradually,
customary international law expanded its recognition of a state's sovereignty over adjacent waters to enable the protection of coastland.s 0
Even as recently as 1980, territorial waters were only recognized for
the narrow band of water three miles from the coast, and, again, only
125 SeeJeffrey Gettleman, What Tho. Jefferson Kneo About Pirates,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12,
2009, at WK 4 (describing the U.S. Navy's bombardments of the Barbary Coast in

response to piracy).
126 That is only to say that there was an attempt to define piracy in a comprehensive manner, not that this process resulted in the crystallization of previously recognized international norms or the creation of superseding new international legal
norms.
127 Murphy, supra note 18, at 157.
128 Joseph W. Bingham, Piracy, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 739, 764 (Supp. 1932).
129 See generaily HuGo GRoTIus, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAs (James Brown Scott ed.,
Ralph Van Deman Magoffin trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1916) (1608) (arguing that the
seas are open to all).
130 R v. Keyn, (1876) 2 Exch. Div. 63, 191 (opinion of Cockburn, CJ.) (discussing
the view that the territorial sea was the distance reachable by cannon fire).
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to provide for the defense and security of the nearby land. 13s But as
colonized states asserted and received their independence, they also
asserted a much broader and unprecedented territorial sea.132 In
1982, the third U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea 13 3 (UNCLOS
III) extended every state's territorial sea to twelve miles from the
coast, 1 3 4 and granted an exclusive economic zone as far as two hundred miles from the coast.13 5 The expansion of territorial seas and
the attendant exclusion of foreign warships13 6-except for purposes
of transit-naturally crippled the capacity for an international
response to piratical activity.
UNCLOS III's most significant blow to international anti-piracy
efforts, however, was not the expansion of the territorial sea, but
rather was the restriction of legally cognizable piracy to the high
seas.13 7 Piratical acts occurring in territorial seas were to be considered merely armed robbery on the sea. Armed robbery at sea, according to UNCLOS III, is not subject to the jurisdiction of any state, but
rather only to the domestic jurisdiction of the state in whose territorial
water the armed robber acts.13 8 UNCLOS III, by exiling piracy to the
high seas, ignored the original nature of universal jurisdiction over
pirates as a compromise with respect to territorial sovereignty, and
thereby gutted the law of piracy of its most fundamental provision.
The vastly different global geopolitical environment of the twentieth century made it appear reasonable to sacrifice piracy law in order
to establish a new and more definitive world legal order. The converSee GorrSCHALK & FLANAGAN, supra note 2, at 33; see also MARK W. JANIS, SEA
SEA, at xiii-xiv (1976) (describing the customary international law of a three-mile territory that prevailed until the end of World War II).
132 See Ann L. Hollick, The Origins of 200-Mile Offshore Zones, 71 Am.J. INr'L L. 494,
494-500 (1977) (describing a failed attempt by several Latin American states to assert
a two hundred mile territorial sea). Another example of an unprecedented claim
during this period is the now internationally accepted Truman Proclamation, which
asserted U.S. sovereignty over part of the continental shelf beyond the U.S. territorial
sea. Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 39 (Supp. 1945). The State Department's
Office of Economic Affairs resisted the adoption of such an assertion because it was
such a departure from customary international law that the proposal could lead to
serious misunderstandings with foreign countries. See Memorandum by the Office of
Economic Affairs (Sept. 23, 1944), in 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1845. 1485-86 (1967).
133 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS III].
134 Id. art. 3.
135 Id. art. 57.
136 See id. arts. 29-32.
137 See Murphy, supra note 18, at 159.
138 See id. at 155; UNCLOS III, supra note 133, art. 105.
131

POWER AND THE LAW OF THE
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gence of increased emphasis on territorial sovereignty over coastal
waters, a virtual elimination of large-scale piratical activity, and an
apparent presumption that sovereign states were capable of dealing
with whatever piracy still remained led to a codification of international maritime law that threatened to nullify two thousand years of
international customary law on piracy. The twentieth century circumstances that made piracy so easy to dismiss are no longer representative of the world in the twenty-first century. It can no longer be said
that large-scale piracy is an anachronism, and it can no longer be
assumed that sovereign states are capable of successfully fighting their
own pirates. Easy cases-such as the twentieth century problem of
piracy-make bad law,' 39 but we should not feel obligated to carry
UNCLOS III's twentieth-century piracy law into the twenty-first
century.
As it concerns certain aspects of piracy, UNCLOS III is more than
bad law; it is invalid law. The element of the law of piracy permitting
universal judicial jurisdiction 4 0 over pirates wherever they are found
is unsusceptible to override by treaty because the prohibition of piracy
is a peremptory norm of general international law or jus cogens.141 For
a norm to qualify as jus cogens, the international community must recognize the norm as "'essential for the protection of [its] fundamental
interests." 4 2 The international ban on piracy is jus cogens because it
is essential to the international community's fundamental interests to
eliminate stateless pariahs that threaten global security. Thus,
UNCLOS III cannot circumscribe the application of piracy law by
reconstituting piratical activity as armed robbery on the sea. Furthermore, universal judicial jurisdiction attaches to pirates regardless of
the territory in which they are found, as it does to most criminals who
violate jus cogens norms, because piracy represents a serious "attack on
the international legal order," and because such jurisdiction is part of
a longstanding international practice that is still invoked by courts
139

O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 804 (1980) (Blackmun,

J., concurring). Justice Blackmun observed that "the intuitively sensed obviousness of
a case induces a rush to judgment, in which a convenient rationale is too readily
embraced without full consideration of its internal coherence or future ramifications." Id.
140 This section refers to universal judicialjurisdiction as opposed to universal
enforcementjurisdiction. See infra Part LI.B for further discussion of universal enforcement jurisdiction.
141 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 ("A treaty is void if. . . it conflicts with a peremptory norm of
general international law.").
142 ArroNIo CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 6.5.2, at 141 (2001) (quoting R. Ago,
Special Rapporteur) (emphasis omitted).
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today.14 3 Thus, UNCLOS III did not, indeed could not, as a mere
treaty, undo one of the most ancient and well-respected international
laws and the most fundamental element of the law of piracy.
A peremptory norm, such as universal judicial jurisdiction over
pirates, may be supplanted by a new peremptory norm of the same
character; but the provisions of UNCLOS III regarding piracy law do
not possess the requisite character of jus cogens to invalidate universal
judicial jurisdiction over pirates. UNCLOS III piracy rules cannot
claim to have the general acceptance required to be jus cogens because
due consideration was not given to those rules. UNCLOS III was a
package deal.14 4 While the conference was attended by over 150
states, the fact that reservations to the terms of the treaty were generally prohibited raises the distinct possibility that many countries felt
that the piracy provisions, although objectionable, were not worth the
trouble of derailing such a massive convention. 4 5 It cannot be said,
therefore, that the piracy laws codified in UNCLOS III were generally
accepted by the community of nations.
Indeed, to the extent that it can be asserted that the laws of piracy
were seriously considered at all in the ratification of the treaty, they
were certainly the product of bargain and compromise rather than
universal acceptance. The piracy laws of UNCLOS III were taken
from UNCLOS I,146 almost unchanged.14 7 UNCLOS I in turn took its
piracy provisions from those proposed by the International Law Commission-unofficial successors to the Harvard Group-whose goal was
to appease the political interests of states on a vast array of maritime
legal issues in order to encourage state attendance and ratification of
UNCLOS I, rather than to determine with diligence and accuracy the
customary law of piracy. 148 As a result, "the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference adopted only those parts of the [Harvard] Draft recommended by the Commission, and the Commission recommended only
143 See R v. Bow St. Metro Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex PartePinochet (No.3), [2000]
1 A.C. 147, 275 (H.L. 1999) (opinion of Lord Millet); CASSESE, supra note 142, at 141;
see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (comparing the torturer to "the pirate and slave trader before him," referring to him as hostis humani
genenis, and declaring universal jurisdiction over him appropriate).
144 See Hugo Caminos & Michael R. Molitor, ProgressiveDevelopment of International
Law and the Package Deal, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 871, 873 (1985).
145 See UNCLOS III, supra note 133, art. 309; cf Caminos & Molitor, supra note
144, at 873, 882 (observing that the breadth of inclusion suggests wide acceptance of
the treaty terms, and that the treaty terms were considered to be indivisible).
146 United Nations Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Apr.
29, 1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
147 Murphy, supra note 18, at 158.
148 See id.

1218

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 85:3

those that it thought the Conference would accept."1 4 9 The substance
and process of the ratification of piracy laws as provided in UNCLOS
III do not merit the status of peremptory norms of general international law, and therefore cannot trump the longstanding law of universal judicial jurisdiction over pirates.
B.

InternationalLaw and the Use of Force in the Wake of the
U.N. Charter

The survival of universal judicialjurisdiction over pirates does not
entail the survival of universal enforcementjurisdiction over pirates. At
first glance, the two elements of the customary law of piracy may
appear inseparable, as a state's ability to put pirates on trial seems to
contemplate a state's ability to arrest pirates. However, universal
enforcement jurisdiction generally has not enjoyed the degree of
acceptance enjoyed by universal judicial jurisdiction. Although states
enjoyed considerable independence in their decision to resort to
force prior to World War II, the general inviolability of territorial
integrity was still an important tenet of international law.' 5 0 The freedom to resort to force, however, was curtailed sharply with the advent
of the United Nations.' 5 ' The U.N. Charter, through Article 2(4),152
"introduced .

.

. a radically new notion: a general prohibition of the

unilateral resort to force by states."15 3 Over the years, this general
prohibition has been recognized widely as a jus cogens norm. 15 4 As a
jus cogens norm latest in time, the prohibition against unilateral state
use of force in the territory of a foreign state overrides any international customary law or jus cogens norm that may have existed with
regard to universal enforcement jurisdiction. Thus, the U.N. Charter
effectively eliminated any provision of the law of piracy for universal
enforcement jurisdiction over pirates.
149 Id.
150 See The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370-71 (1824) ("It would be monstrous to suppose that our revenue officers were authorized to enter into foreign ports
and territories, for the purpose of seizing vessels which had offended against our
laws."). This declaration may be distinguished from cases of piracy because pirates do
not offend against the law of any one mere state, but against the law of nations itself.
151 See W. Michael Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: ConstruingCharterArticle 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642, 642 (1984).
152 See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state . . . .").

153 Reisman, supra note 151, at 642.
154 See Oscar Schachter, The Legality of Pro-DemocraticInvasion, 78 AM.
645, 648 (1984).
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The one exception that the Charter does allow to its prohibition
on the unilateral use of force is self-defense.15 5 This self-defense
exception-established by Article 51 of the Charter-would, in certain extreme circumstances, permit states to use force in the territory
of another state against pirates.15 6 International law imposes five conditions on the right of self-defense. The use of force must be: (1) for
a defensive purpose,' 5 7 (2) in response to a significant armed
attack,1 58 (3) against the responsible party,15 9 (4) in accordance with
the principles of necessity and proportionality,16 0 and (5) reported to
the Security Council.' 6 '
All members of the international community of states have the
Article 51 right to use force in self-defense in both their collective and
individual capacities in response to the armed attacks of the Somali
pirates. Such a response would certainly meet the requirement of having a defensive purpose. For a use of force to have a defensive purpose it "must aim at stopping an attack in progress, defending against
a future attack once an attack has occurred, or ending an unlawful
occupation."16 2 In the context of Somali piracy, any international
response against pirates in Somali territory could easily be justified as
defense against a future attack, because the chance of another pirate
attack is virtually certain.
A state's armed response to Somali piracy could also conform to
the "necessary and proportional force" limitation on self-defense.
This limitation restricts the use of force only to that force which is
"necessary to accomplish a reasonable military objective,"i16 and even
then only to that force that would not lead to civilian collateral damage "excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advan155 See U.N. Charter art. 51.
156 See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 116, 11 11-12 (Dec. 19) (separate opinion of Judge Simma)
(arguing that armed attacks by irregular forces of a non-state actor can give rise to the
right to use force unilaterally in self-defense).
157 U.N. Charter art. 51.
158 Id. Article 51 conditions self-defense on the occurrence of an "armed attack,"
but later case law in the International Court of Justice has construed this to require
the armed attack to be "significant." See Military & Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
159 See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, 2005 I.C.J. at 1 146.
160 Oil Platforms, (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 198 (Nov. 6) (quoting Military &'
ParamilitaryActivities, 1986 1.C.J. at 94).
161 See U.N. Charter art. 51.
162 Mary Ellen O'Connell, Lawful Self-Defense to Terrorism, 63 U. Prr-r. L. REv. 889,
893 (2002).
163 Id. at 903.
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tage anticipated."16 4 In the battle against Somali pirates there should
be little trouble meeting the condition for necessary and proportional
force assuming that a state limited its use of force to that required to
bring Somali pirates to justice, and did not become ensnared in the
larger Somali civil war.
The two greatest potential stumbling blocks for an Article 51 use
of force against Somali pirates are meeting the conditions of using
force against the responsible party, and only using force in response
to a significant armed attack. States are not the only actors that can
perpetrate significant armed attacks. 165 Indeed, significant armed
attacks may be attributed to "armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries" provided that those attacks are of a sufficient magnitude.1 6 6
The magnitude of an armed attack may be measured by considering
the cumulative effect of armed attacks in the past, and it is not necessarily measured by the death toll of the armed attack. 167 Instead, the
requisite magnitude of an attack appears to be measured by the general disruption to global security and the world order. Thus, while al
Qaeda's 2001 attack on the World Trade Center in New York City,
which resulted in 3000 deaths, was considered a significant armed
attack,16 8 the United States' recruiting, training, arming, financing,
directing and facilitating of the Contras in Nicaragua that resulted in
over 25,000 deaths was not considered a significant armed attack. 169
It is therefore possible that under extreme circumstances, activity by
irregular forces that does not cause a relatively substantial number of
casualties can nevertheless constitute a significant armed attack.
The right of self-defense is conditioned on its exercise against the
party responsible for the initial attack. 170 Difficulties arise where a
state does not directly carry out an attack. There is controversy over
whether irregular forces may be a responsible party within the meaning of Article 51. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) opinions
have taken an unnecessarily restrictive view of Article 51, limiting the
164 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 57,
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; see also O'Connell, supra note 162, at 903 (discussing
the requirements of Protocol 1).
165 See Military & ParamilitaryActivities, 1986 I.C.J. at 119.
166 See id. at 103-04.
167 See id. (observing that the proper analysis for determining the occurrence of
an armed attack involves an examination of the operation's "scale and effects").
168 See O'Connell, supra note 162, at 893.
169 See Military & ParamilitaryActivities, 1986 I.C.J. at 93-94; Daniel Ortega Saavedra, More Contra Aid, More Suffering, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 14, 1988, at A31.
170 See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 116, 1 146 (Dec. 19).
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right of self-defense exclusively to situations where attacks are imputable to foreign states.17 1 Thus, in the ICJ's advisory opinion, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Ternitory,172 the Court determined that Israel had no Article 51 right to
the use of force because Israel did not claim that it was under attack
from a foreign state.1 73 However, in light of the increasing relevance
of irregular forces, and trans-state terrorist organizations in particular,
there has been a shift in the doctrine of self-defense. 174 The international community is now willing to accept that nonstate actors can
carry out significant armed attacks that trigger a right to self-defense.
In fact, Judges Simma and Kooijmans noted in separate opinions to
an ICJ ruling that, "it would be unreasonable to deny the attacked
State the right to self-defence merely because there is no attacker
State . . . ."7 This shift in international law may be observed in the
global support for the United States' use of force in Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks of September 11th as demonstrated by
Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373.176 In territories nominally part of a state but over which governmental authority is almost
completely absent, it would defy common sense to prohibit the use of
force in self-defense in the name of territorial integrity. While international law is in a state of flux regarding the legal capacity of transstate actors, there is a logical trend toward permitting states to use
force in lawless foreign territories against nonstate actors. This trend
should inform the legal standard employed today, and thus a nonstate actor should be treated as a responsible party where the territory
in which it may be found is almost completely devoid of governmental
authority.
The Somali pirate attacks do constitute significant armed attacks,
and Somali pirates should be regarded as the responsible parties and
the legitimate targets of military strikes in self-defense, even in Somali
territory. While the Somali pirates kill less than one hundred people
annually, they engage in hundreds of indiscriminate attacks armed
with increasingly lethal weaponry, putting any ship as far as seven hun171 See id. 11 9-10 (separate opinion of Judge Simma).
172 Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9).
173 See id. at 194.
174 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, 2005 I.C.J. at 11 (separate opinion
of Judge Simma).
175 Id. 1 12 (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).
176 See id. 1 11. See generally S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12,
2001) (condemning the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (same).
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dred miles off the Somali coast in peril' 7 7 and taking several hundred
seafarers hostage each year.' 7 8 The pirates have demonstrated that
they pose a grave threat to global security and the world order, as
their victims have included the United Nations, and the cargo seized
has included tanks, desperately needed food aid, and thousands of
barrels of oil. The Somali pirates' violent attacks have turned the
waters off Somalia-through which eight percent of the world's trade
and twelve percent of the world's oil passes' 7 9-into the most dangerous in the Indian Ocean. Thus, the Somali pirate attacks have surpassed mere frontier incidents and, taken cumulatively, have risen to
the level of a significant armed attack. These attacks trigger the right
of states to use force against the pirates, and due to the almost complete lack of governmental authority in the Somali territory, the states
may use force in Somalia to effectively respond to pirate attacks.
Every state has the inherent right under Article 51 to take action
against the Somali pirates on the grounds of self-defense. The Somali
pirates are at war with the world, and they have substantially disrupted
global security, thereby mounting a significant armed attack against
the world. Moreover, because Somalia is a failed state lacking governmental control over most of its territory,18 0 foreign states are permitted under international law to use force in Somali territory to defend
themselves. The use of force against the Somali pirates by any state
thus has only three conditions on its implementation. The use of
force must be necessary, it must be proportional, and it must be
reported to the United Nations.
In the wake of the Charter, the only method of enforcing the law
of piracy against Somali pirates within Somali territory other than
under a theory of Article 51 self-defense is by authorization from the
Security Council.18 The Security Council may take whatever actions
it deems "necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security."1 82 Security Council actions may be taken in response to anything from a breach of peace to a mere threat to peace.18 3 At the
177

See Andrew Jacobs, China Warns Pirates Who Hijacked Cargo Ship off Somalia, N.Y.

TIMES, Oct. 22, 2009, at A19.

178 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
179 See Int'l Maritime Org., supra note 64.
180 See Gettleman, Islamist Militants, supra note 99. While many governments may
have a limited ability to exclude rival governments and armies from the territory that
they claim, that fact alone does not amount to governmental authority over a territory
with respect to jus ad bellum.
181 See U.N. Charter art. 39.
182 Id. art. 42.
183 See id. art. 39.
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Security Council's discretion, it may call upon all or a select few U.N.
member states to enforce any action that the Security Council deems
necessary for the maintenance of international peace.184
It is within the expansive powers of the Security Council to take
action against Somali pirates. The Somali pirates, at a minimum, constitute a threat to peace that the Security Council is empowered to
counter by itself or with the aid of U.N. members. Thus, the current
U.N. Security Resolutions authorizing member states to use force
against Somali pirates in Somalia are within the power of the United
Nations, and represent another legally permissible method of exercising enforcement jurisdiction over the Somali pirates.
C.

The Human Rights of the Enemy of All Mankind

As the "enemies of all mankind," pirates separate themselves
from society by their acts. This separation is recognized in the law by
granting universal judicial jurisdiction over pirates and effectively
depriving them of their citizenship for the purposes of trying and
punishing them. The denial of citizenship is an extreme legal measure that would, were it not for the law's peremptory status, violate a
pirate's human rights under international law and constitute cruel
and unusual punishment under the U.S. Constitution.18 5 While a
pirate may temporarily lose his or her citizenship, there is simply no
act, whether executed autonomously or imposed externally, that can
strip human beings of their humanity and thus of their human rights.
Indeed, several human rights treaties of the latter half of the twentieth
century did not condition any rights granted on a person's
citizenship. 186
As persons endowed with human rights, pirates have rights to certain treatment while legal proceedings are being exercised against
them, as well as during and after the administration of punishment.
The treatment owed to pirates during legal proceedings is a minimal
184 Id. art. 48.
185 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) ("No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his nationality . . . ."); see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)
(holding that depriving a U.S. citizen of his citizenship for deserting the military violates the Eighth Amendment). "[Deprivation of citizenship] is a form of punishment
more primitive than torture . . .

."

Id. at 101.

186 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16,1966) (entered into
force Mar. 23, 1976); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(Dec. 16, 1966) (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
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form of due process-that is, pirates are entitled to a fair trialI 8 7 and
equal protection under the law.'*8 The treatment owed pirates during and after the administration of punishment is the right to be free
from torture or "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."18 9 These very basic human rights are hopefully simple enough
for advanced democratic nations to provide while the convicted
pirates are in their custody. Other countries in the Horn of Africa
region, such as Kenya, have also been found capable of administering
justice to pirates in a fair, humane and impartial manner.19 0 The
legal complications of prosecuting piracy in connection with human
rights do not stem primarily from a lack ofjurisdiction or an inability
to provide sufficient human rights protections; rather, the major legal
complications arise after a pirate has been punished and is due to be
released from the custody of the prosecuting state.
After a pirate has been duly punished, his citizenship is reinstated, and, ceteris paf bus, the pirate should be returned to the state of
which he is a citizen. However, for most states,19 1 this general treatment is subject to Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture (CAT),
which prohibits the return of "a person to another State where there
are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of
being subjected to torture . . . ."19 In making this determination,
authorities should "take into account all relevant considerations
including . . . the existence in the State concerned of a consistent
pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights."1 93 At
first glance, the CAT may appear to bar the forced return of anyone,
including pirates, to Somalia. Somalia has had no functioning central
government since 1991, has been largely dominated by warlords of
rival and warring clans, and has been in the grips of an Islamic revolutionary movement whose stated goal is to make Somalia an Islamic
187 The Nuremberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 107 (1946) ("With regard to the constitution of the court, all that the defendants are entitled to ask is to receive a fair trial on
the facts and law.").
188

See id.; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 185, art. 7.

189 Id. art. 5.
190 See Kontorovich, supra note 16; Bahar, supra note 18, at 16-17 (describing a
Kenyan court's fair treatment of pirates captured by the U.S. Navy); see also Gettleman, supra note 109 (reporting that the British plan is to routinely hand over individuals captured in the region and suspected of piracy to Kenyan courts for trial).
191 The United States ratified the CAT through the Torture Victim Protection Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
192 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
193 Id.
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state and impose Islamic law. 19 4 As a result, to the extent that there is
law in Somalia it has often been arbitrary and cruel.19 5 Nonetheless,
the CAT does not, under these circumstances, proscribe the return of
individuals to Somalia.
The CAT only imposes a duty upon states to refrain from
returning individuals to their country of origin when government officials of that country know of or remain willfully blind to acts of torture.1 96 Simple knowledge of a national condition in which acts of
torture are likely to occur does not rise to the character of willful
blindness, provided that government officials are in fact actively
attempting to suppress the torturous acts. 197 Therefore, the U.S. government (and any other country) may, consistent with international
law and CAT, return citizens of Somalia to Somalia provided that reasonable diplomatic assurances are made that either torture is not
likely to occur in the territory of the particular government or that,
given that torture upon return is plausible, persons acting in an official governmental capacity are acting to suppress such tortuous acts.
The perennial state of civil war in Somalia makes it difficult, but
not impossible, to determine who is acting in an official capacity.
There are numerous organizations claiming to be the government of
Somalia, or part of Somalia, or entirely independent of Somalia, and
none of them control all of Somalia.1 9S TFG is currently recognized
by the international community as the sole legitimate government in
Somalia, but now controls only a few city blocks in Mogadishu and is
chronically teetering on the verge of collapse. 199 Its predominant
194 See Gettleman, Islamist Militants, supra note 99; Jeffrey Gettleman, Situation in
Somalia Seems About to Get Worse, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2008, at A6.
195 See, e.g., Jeffrey Gettleman, Somalia: Rape Victim Executed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29,
2008, at A9 (reporting the public execution by stoning of a woman accused of
adultery).
196 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, supra note 192, art. 1; Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 171
(2d Cir. 2004); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a) (1) (2009) (limiting the definition of torture to
the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering on a person for certain purposes
"when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent
or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity");
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punimhment, uwnra note 19, art. 1
197 See Hernandez Aquino v. Mukasey, 297 F. App'x 35, 37 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that there were no grounds for non-refoulement of an individual who had been
threatened with torture by powerful gangs in El Salvador because, "although gang
violence is pervasive in El Salvador, the evidence did not demonstrate that the government of El Salvador acquiesced in such violence").
198 See Lehr & Lehmann, supra note 68, at 8-11.
199 See Gettleman, Islamist Militants, supra note 99.
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nemesis is the Shabab-a multi-clan army determined to overthrow
the TFG and transform Somalia into an Islamic state.20 0 The Shabab
controls territory within Somalia and may be said to govern the
residents of part of that territory, although the Shabab has been designated a terrorist organization by the United States.2 0 1 Another governmental body is the government of Somaliland, which declared its
independence from Somalia in 1991 and has maintained a relatively
peaceful, orderly, and democratic society. Somaliland has an independent military wing financed by the United States, although neither
the United States nor the rest of the international community recognize its independence. 2 0 2 Finally, there is the government of Puntland, which is a semi-stable region that has considered itself semiautonomous since 1998.203 Obviously there is and will continue to be
conflict over the governance and political control of Somalia.
Despite the ongoing civil war in Somalia and the assertions by
various groups of legitimate governmental authority, the determination of who is acting in an official governmental capacity for the purposes of human rights law is actually quite simple. The application of
international human rights law does not require that a given state be
unified under one government, nor does it require that any particular
government operating within a state be recognized by the international community. 204 The determining factor of state action for the
purposes of applying international human rights law is "merely the
semblance of official authority."2 05 While Somalia lacked a central
government for over seventeen years, it has had no shortage of political organizations purporting to have official authority and acting
under such representations. Each of the aforementioned Somali
political organizations control and govern a territory that is generally
identifiable at any given time, which is sufficient to consider any individual acting under the authority of these regimes to be acting in an
official capacity for the purposes of international human rights law.20 6
200 SeeJeffrey Gettleman, Somalia Makes Peace Deal with a Militia, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
27, 2008, at All.
201 See id.
202 See Lehr & Lehmann, supra note 68, at 9.
203 Id.
204 See Kadic v. Karadie, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that the "customary international law of human rights . .. applies to states without distinction between
recognized and unrecognized states").
205 Id.
206 Governmental authority for the purposes of international human rights law is
distinct from governmental authority for the purposes of triggering a right to selfdefense against a nonstate actor within foreign territory. Human rights law looks to
define governmental authority broadly so as to ensure that perpetrators of human
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The acknowledgment of separate legally cognizable de facto governments in a period of civil war enables distinctions to be drawn
among Somali governments such that gross violations of human rights
by one government in a particular region of Somalia do not prejudice
the human rights record of another government in Somalia.2 0 7 For
the duration of this civil war, villages, towns, cities, and whole regions
of Somalia will likely change hands among warring factions, and rival
factions will be formed, altered, and dissolved. Throughout these turbulent and uncertain times, however, the territories of rival Somali
factions may be distinguished on the basis of de facto control, and the
governments may be held accountable for their human rights
records. 2 08
Foreign state signatories to the CAT may thus return Somali
pirates to Somalia provided that the de facto governing body of the
region into which they are released does not acquiesce to acts of torture. This will require such CAT signatories to make a two-pronged
analysis in evaluating whether a Somali may be returned to a particular region. First, the CAT signatory must determine which de facto
governments are able to provide adequate diplomatic assurances that
their officials do not participate in, and are not willfully blind to, acts
of torture. Second, the CAT signatory must identify into which sufficiently safe de facto government's control the Somali citizen is to be
returned. This will naturally be a fact intensive analysis, but it does
appear that at least some regions in Somalia-Somaliland, for
instance-are under de facto control of governments that may be able
to provide adequate assurance of the preservation of human rights of
returned Somali pirates.20 9
rights abuses cannot escape liability by asserting non-governmental status. Thus, the
litmus test for human rights law is a "semblance of official authority." See id. at 245.
For the purposes of jus ad bellum, the threshold for governmental authority is set
higher in order to more accurately capture a realistic picture of the balance of power
among state and non-state actors as well as to allow foreign states to defend themselves against nonstate actors based in weak and potentially hostile states. Thus, the
litmus test for jus ad bellum is "almost complete absence of governmental authority in
the whole or part of the territory." See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda) 2005 I.C.J. 116, It 9-12 (Dec. 19) (separate opinion
of Judge Simma).
207 Cf Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 180-81 (1877) (evaluating the validity of
actions of de facto governments during a time of civil war).
208 See id.
209 See Gettleman, supra note 73 (observing that Puntland provides jails for
pirates); see also Ibrahim & Gettleman, supra note 101 ("The Somaliland government
has been credited with setting up a small but functioning democracy, and providing a
degree of peace and safety to more than a million people.").
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PiRATEs' LEGAL STATUS
The customary international law of piracy provides states with
maximum flexibility in their pursuit of pirates. This flexibility is the
result of two key factors in piracy law. First, international piracy law
allows municipal governments broad discretion in establishing the
extent to which they criminalize piratical activity. Second, universal
judicial jurisdiction grants every state jurisdiction to try pirates regardless of where they may be found or their state of origin. These two
factors enable states that cooperate with each other to choose among
a wide range of legal regimes to which they may subject pirates.
However, legislation and adjudication are only part of the piracy
puzzle. To actually enforce the international law of piracy against
pirates in a foreign state, either the states must have the permission of
the Security Council or the pirate attacks must trigger an Article 51
right of self defense. There are, of course, prudential concerns that
may caution against exercising universal enforcement jurisdiction
over pirates in all cases. 2 10 Acts of executive authority in foreign territorial lands and waters are often unwelcome and provocative, regardless of the foreign government's ability to uphold the rule of law.
Nonetheless, neither the law of piracy nor the jus ad bellum function as
a complete bar to all such acts; instead, they allow such determinations to be made on a case-by-case basis.
Human rights law has emerged as a new element in international
law and the law of piracy. This recent addition requires that legal
proceedings against a pirate accord them a fair trial, and that after a
sentence has been carried out, he is returned to his country of origin.2 11 The pirate's return may-depending on the treaty obligations
of the prosecuting state-be subject to the limitation that the pirate
be free from torture upon return. 212
210 For example, several states, such as Indonesia, are highly protective of their
territorial seas, and are vehemently opposed to granting foreign nations the legal
authority to pursue the enormous number of pirates in their territorial waters. See
Bahar, supra note 18, at 22. In the case of Indonesia, U.S. interests are likely better
served by sacrificing enhanced anti-piracy enforcement in order to avoid angering
and provoking the Indonesian government and populace.
211 See supra Part III.C.
212 Where a pirate may not be returned because there is a substantial likelihood of
torture upon return, the state that has the pirate in its custody may be obligated to
release the former pirate into its own territory. Cf In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee
Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 43 (D.D.C. 2008) (releasing seventeen Uighurs into the
Washington, D.C. area, after the government conceded their detention was no longer
necessary and had failed to find a country willing to receive them after over three
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In the context of Somalia, the pirate's legal status so defined
grants every country the legal authority to participate in the three fundamental elements of an international response to piracy-namely,
enforcement, adjudication, and refoulement. In enforcing anti-piracy
law, every country is entitled to patrol Somalia for pirates wherever
they may be found, on land and sea, and to arrest such pirates. After
arrest, countries may subsequently try the captured pirates themselves
or deliver them to another competent and fair tribunal for trial.
Finally, countries have the authority and the right to return punished
pirates to a Somali territory in which officials do not acquiesce to acts
of torture.
The international community needs to change its present
approach to the anti-piracy enforcement in three crucial ways. First,
the international community should recognize that states do not
require Security Council approval to engage in counter-piracy measures and enforce anti-piracy laws in Somalia. Every state has the
inherent right to use force against the Somali pirates under Article 51,
and a global understanding of that point will provide the legal support for more confident, aggressive, and effective anti-piracy initiatives. Second, the United Nations should not condition foreign antipiracy measures in Somalia on the TFG's permission. Such a condition is harmless enough in this situation where the TFG has incentive
to grant permission because in doing so it is legitimized as the official
Somali government, strengthened by the presence of allies, and
benefitted by a reduction in the number of pirates. However, setting
a precedent whereby the effectiveness of anti-piracy measures-and
any measures countering non-state actors-are beholden to the
whims of an inept governmental organization does not serve the purpose of legitimizing the anti-piracy measures or ensuring that foreign
states will not encounter organized domestic resistance while pursuing
pirates. Furthermore, the TFG's participation in the anarchy of a
failed state does not vest it with the legal authority to bind the entire
country in allowing any and all nations to enter its territory.2 1 3 This
years and almost one hundred requests to various countries), rev'd, Kiyemba v.
Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. granted, No. 08-1234, 2009 WL 935637
(U.S. Oct. 20, 2009).
213 Cf Williams, 96 U.S. at 186 (finding that the validity of the acts of a de facto
government that is engaged in civil war in which it has control over a portion of the
territory embroiled in war "depends entirely upon [the government's] ultimate success" in the war); Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg &
Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 280 (7th Cir. 1990) (refusing to recognize the
validity of acts of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus because it lacked international recognition (besides Turkey) and had failed to take control over the entire
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provision exposes important global anti-piracy efforts to unnecessary
vulnerability and uncertainty, and establishes bad precedent. Third,
while it is not legally mandated under the principle of universal jurisdiction, the global anti-piracy effort would likely benefit from an
established legal adjudication process for all Somali pirates. This
would serve the purposes of legitimizing anti-piracy efforts, eliminating confusion surrounding the pirate's prosecution after arrest, allaying fears of legal complications with respect to refoulement, and
enabling concentration of human rights resources so as to ensure that
pirates both during and after arrest are treated in accordance with
international human rights law.
CONCLUSION

In the effort to engage the enemy of mankind in battle, the civilized world needs the law. The law provides certainty by informing
states of the extent of their power and affirmative obligations. So
informed, states are able to effectively coordinate among themselves
and proceed with confidence in the legitimacy of their actions. The
law also grants states freedom of action so that the community of
nations might be able to respond to problems in ways that the states
determine are both effective and reasonable under the circumstances.
The modern law of piracy provides both certainty and freedom of
action. States may look to and rely on the law of piracy when designing an international legal process in response to the Somali pirates.
But there is no legally prescribed international response to Somali
piracy. A response could take a number of different forms, and it is
the law of piracy that allows states this broad discretion to determine
the most reasonable way to combat particularly extreme forms of
piracy in the lawless corners of the world. Indeed, the international
community should combat pirates, if not around the world, at least in
Somalia, where pirates pose a serious threat to the life and welfare of
millions of people and the domestic government is powerless to stop
them.

island of Cyprus); Bahar, supra note 18, at 71 (cautioning, on the basis of unforeseeable legal implications, against the acceptance of the TFG's permission to pursue
pirates in Somali territorial seas).

